

THE
PROPER OBJECT
OF THE
PRESENT WAR
WITH
FRANCE AND SPAIN
CONSIDERED;
AND THE
INDEPENDENCE of GREAT BRI-
TAIN vindicated from any Connection
with FOREIGN POLITICS.

*Victoria nobis in manu. Tantum modo incepto
opus est ; cetera res expediet.* SALLUST.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Author of this Pamphlet takes the liberty of assuring the Public, that he is connected with no party, and is influenced by no views of private interest. He has given his thoughts on several important matters with the best intention; he has freely marked what appeared to him amiss in the conduct of affairs, and pointed out what he thinks is the best method of retrieving them, and of carrying on the double war in which we are now engaged, in order to procure a speedy and lasting peace. A great part of what he advances is from his own knowledge: what he asserts upon the testimony of others, he has endeavoured to be truly informed of. As the intention of it is to shew the Public, that the prosperity and independence of Great Britain is fixed on a more firm basis than the feeble support of a foreign alliance, he hopes it will be candidly received and examined.

In pointing out the vulnerable parts of the Spanish monarchy, I omitted the island of Porto Rico, lying to the westward, and in sight of the Virgin Islands. According to the best information I could get, it is very much neglected by the Spaniards, and I believe is in a
bad

A D V E R T I S E M E N T.

bad state of defence. The Dutch from St. Eustatia, and several small vessels from our Leeward Islands, carry on a little private trade with the inhabitants by way of barter; so that proper pilots for such an expedition might be easily procured either at St. Christopher's, or the neighbouring islands. The principal town is St. John de Porto Rico, lying on the north side about the middle. Our ships can sail into the bay without tacking, which would be an advantage in the attack, that is not to be found in many other places of the West Indies, because their ports are generally situated on the leeward, or west parts of the islands. As the outward-bound Spaniards generally make the north side of this island, it would be a very convenient station for our cruisers. It is an island very improveable, and larger than Barbadoes and all our Leeward Islands put together.

Trinidado, an island at the mouth of the river Oronoko, and in sight of Tobago, is in a very defenceless state, and very thinly inhabited; so that it could be easily seized upon: but, as it is very shallow opposite to the principal settlement, small vessels would be necessary to favour the attempt. Though perhaps having possession of this island would not put into our hands Sir Walter Raleigh's gold mines at the head of Oronoko river, yet it would enable us to supply all our squadrons in the West Indies, and all the islands, with cattle for almost no price: the herds upon the banks of that river are innumerable, and the inhabitants set no value upon them.

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THE
PROPER OBJECT
OF THE
PRESENT WAR, &c.

THE parliament was so liberal in granting supplies for the German war, and so ready to acquiesce in raising additional troops, that, before the appearance of this rupture with Spain, there was no room to expect our forces would be recalled, or our continental measures broke off; but they are big with so much public ruin, and are so plainly contrary to our interest, that we may do the good sense of the parliament and ministry so much honour as sincerely
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to believe, that, did they think it consistent with public faith, they soon would rid themselves of this intolerable burthen, and were they once free, that they never would again enter into such pernicious engagements. All that, before this event, we could hope for was, that the war would be managed with some frugality, and a strict inquiry be made into the manner in which the prodigious sums sent thither have been expended. But this present insolence of the Spaniards will, we hope, force our ministry into a measure, that before we rather wished than expected to see taken ; for surely they cannot propose to continue the war in Germany, and carry on the Spanish war with that vigour which they ought : however willing they may be, it is, by far, too much for the nation to go through with ; and if one or other must give place, it requires no thought

thought to determine which it must be; unless we reckon it a doubtful case, when our own house is on fire, whether we should not go to chastise a foolish fox-hunter for breaking-down our neighbour's inclosures, while the owner was following him, and enjoying the sport, rather than stay and endeavour to quench the fire, or remove our effects.

The Spaniards intention to enter into the war has been formed with deliberation: they, no doubt, have taken care of the funds for carrying it on for at least two years, without risking their plate-fleets: in this time, from our present reduced condition, they hope we shall be wearied out, and ready to accept such terms as they please to propose; and that, in the mean time, we will not be able to carry on any expedition against them. While they keep their ships in port, their men will be employed in priva-

teers to distress our trade ; and we shall find ourselves so deeply engaged in Germany, that we shall have neither men nor money to fit out any armament to seek them in their ports. The loss of our present trade with Spain will be some additional disadvantage, and render us less able to continue the war, with this comfortable reflection, that the expences of it must be increased.

Though therefore, before this unexpected rupture with Spain, we could not extricate ourselves from our German engagements, we certainly now should stand excused before the whole world to give them up, unless we chuse tamely to submit to such terms as Spain may think proper to impose ; which submission, by the by, would not enable us to be of any more use to our German allies.

But, say they, America has been conquered in Germany ; and, had it
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not been for the German war, England would have been invaded. To those who have attended to the course of the war it will be apparent, that in the condition their marine and our's have been in at the several periods of it, though there had been no war in Germany, they could not have given their colonies any more protection than they did.

Expeditions to Great Britain the French have not often been foolhardy enough to think seriously of: though they might be lavish of their men, they would not be lavish of their ships to convoy and transport them.

But, should we give up the war in Germany, the French would overrun Holland; and then it would be our turn to be conquered next: but what will become of the Dutch, in the first place? Why seem they not alarmed with their own danger? Are
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we bound to protect them against their wills? Have they not all this war, by every underhand method which they could take, under the mask of neutrality, endeavoured to render this voluntary protection of our's ineffectual? Have they not all along favoured the French, covered their property, assisted them with private loans of money, tried to bully and frighten us, because we would not recede from our just rights of searching for French property? And yet, forsooth, these are the people to preserve whose independence we must run ourselves in debt, and involve ourselves in inextricable difficulties.

Yet, even were Holland become a province to France, it would not be any great addition to their naval power, or prejudice to us. It is their freedom alone that makes them a maritime power. The Netherlands, before they were enslaved, flourished
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in commerce ; but of what consequence have they been in Europe, but as a field to fight battles in, since they came under the dominion of Austria and France ? I believe it will be found generally true, that though commerce may flourish under an absolute monarchy, yet the trade which any country enjoyed, when free, always died with its liberty, and never came to the share of the victors.

Besides, the Dutch ports are so shallow, that, for the future, they can never, either free or enslaved, have any respectable navy, because the French and we have very far out-built them : nor is Holland a place any more convenient to invade England from than Normandy or Brittany.---This loss of naval importance, which has befallen the Dutch, from other nations having deeper ports, and out-building them, is, on our side, an object seriously to be considered.

dered. The tide rises on the French coast several feet more than in our principal ports; and, if we can credit people that have been many years conversant in our dock-yards, the ports have been gradually filling up; so that, without due care, the French in a course of years may out-build us. Even now the large ships we have taken from them can with great difficulty be docked *. This great difference in depth of water, will in time force us to improve Milford-haven, and make it one of our principal magazines.

To return to our subject: were Holland subdued, we should, by the assistance of our fleets, be able to engross that carrying trade which they have with all Europe; a trade which is in itself certain profit, and gives them an opportunity of coming in

* In July last they were forced to careen the *Magnanime* in Portsmouth-harbour.

with

with every country for a share of every profitable branch which they engage in. We should on such an event have an opportunity of resuming the herring-fishery to ourselves, which I fear will never succeed in our hands, while the Dutch have the grant of it, and can catch and sell their fish to foreigners at a cheaper rate than we can do. Our superiority at sea will also enable us to take under our protection their valuable colonies in the East Indies, and the large fertile continent of Guiana in the West. We should be able to give such opulent subjects as would retire to us, much greater encouragement than they could expect under the French government. In fine, every advantage which the Dutch as an independent state now enjoy, would be transferred from Holland to England, and be so much additional weight laid in her scale against that of France.

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It is farther said by some in excuse for the German war, that the six millions sent thither yearly is not lost to us, because though it comes not back from thence in the way of trade, yet it may perhaps come back to be deposited in our funds. This is so very absurd, that the man certainly must be in jest who uses such an argument : for to have it back in this way is just as much for our advantage as it would be for the advantage of a country squire, who has lost all his ready money to a sharper, to receive for a mortgage on the best part of his estate that money again in order to risque it a second time in play ; had he not received it back he must have sat down contented with his first loss.

Some that cry out for a German war have been so ignorant as to assert, that we should not have known how to have employed our strength against France, but by meeting them in Germany.

many. Such people have paid very little attention either to our situation as an island, or our interest as a trading nation. Have we given our own trade all that timely and effectual protection which we might have given, by destroying all the several destructive nests of French privateers? Have we seized upon all their colonies, and attacked them in every weak part, that we are brought at last to the necessity of running between their very jaws in Germany, and engaging them where we can least hurt them, where they can most injure us? Indeed, our various changeable ministry seldom appear to be guided by any fixed plan in their operations, or to have any steady point in view. They have fitted out fleets, levied troops, and even sent out expeditions, without having determined what they would have executed by them.

In the beginning of the present war our first measure of seizing the French ships was in the main judicious ; but, by our common custom of doing things by halves, the greatest part of this advantage was lost, by letting them rot in our ports. Had they been sold at first, and the money lodged in the funds, in case of any disadvantage in the course of the war that might have obliged us to such a sacrifice, it would have been ready to be repaid to the French ; and had that not been necessary, would have defrayed some part of our expences. As it was managed the value of them was lost ; and if there be any unfavourable turn in affairs, we must refund the price which they please to set upon them.

The greatest injury our trade has suffered has been from the Bayonne and Martinico privateers : had these two nests been destroyed in the beginning

ginning of the war, our trade in a great measure would have been uninterrupted, and many millions saved to us in captures; yet a man four or five years ago gave in proposals of blocking up Bayonne in such a manner that not one ship should get out or in. It seems the channel is very narrow and difficult. He proposed, under the cover of one or two frigates, to sink directly in the channel, with which he had made himself acquainted, some old ships filled with certain stuff that he described, whose property it was to run together in water. The weight of this (we may call it) lava, was to prevent the ships from being weighed, and before they fell in pieces a bank would be formed around them, which would effectually choak up the river. This is a plan that appears more plausible on paper than perhaps it would be found easy in execution: but could not some other

other method have been found of destroying this ruinous hive of licensed pirates; would not those fifteen thousand men, whose carcases now fatten the German fields, have been able to master it?

Martinico in the beginning of the war might have been taken much easier with five thousand men than it can be at present with fifteen thousand. Had that measure been pursued on that station, we should have saved upwards of three millions sterling in captures, which have been made by a swarm of paltry privateers, from four to fourteen guns. With Martinico must have fallen Guadeloupe, Granada, and all the neutral islands, which must have been a source of infinite wealth to us, and have saved a squadron of about twenty-four sail of men of war, which hath been employed to defend our trade among these islands.

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Here allow me to take notice of a very great neglect in our management: the greatest part of the Martinico privateers are sloops built in our island of Bermudas of a particular sort of timber; and they are of such a particular construction for sailing well, as none but the inhabitants of Bermudas have attained to a facility in building. These vessels are either taken in the common course of trade by the French, and converted into privateers, or sold privately to them, through the mediation of our good friends the Dutch at St. Eustatia. These sloops the French have acquired such a skill in working and sailing, that none but our swiftest sailing frigates, and they too managed by brisk commanders, acquainted with the station and the French manner of working their sloops, can ever catch them. Of these the French have generally from fifty to seventy sail out, cruising

cruising for our trade ; so that the whole tract of our trade is covered with them : and if merchant-ships begin to engage one of them, generally two or three come in, in the course of the fight, and overpower them. Now I would propose, that the inhabitants of Bermudas should be prohibited from building any such vessels in time of war ; and every vessel of that kind should be laid up, upon every rupture with France. The private loss to Bermudas would be but small, and might be easily made up to them. I hope, in considering how the war might have been managed, this will not be reckoned an unnecessary digression.

We have in this war attacked the French colonies, and have been lucky enough to get possession of some of the principal of them. But, by our absurd prejudice for continental measures, the two chief attacks, on Guadaloupe

daloupe and Quebec, were so far starved, that had it not been for very fortunate incidents, which, from our conduct, we had no right to expect, they must have inevitably turned to our great loss and dishonour.

The years 1760 and 1761, which might have put us in possession of Louisiana and Martinico, were trifled away, merely that we might have nothing to hinder us in blustering away on the plains of Westphalia.--- Had all these measures succeeded happily, still there remained the French part of Hispaniola to be subdued: and the present conduct of the Spaniards shews us, that not to attack it, lest we should give them umbrage, was an ill-timed, and has been an ill-repaid deference. Are the French on that island under the protection of the Spaniards? or have the Spaniards prevented them from fitting out privateers to annoy our Jamaica-trade,

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trade, or from supplying their men of war there with seamen and stores? If they have done this, the Spaniards have some right to expect that we should turn our arms another way. If, as is the case, they have not done this, they have no right to expect that we will not, out of respect to them, exert our power to prevent the French in any part of their dominions from hurting us; or to drain, by every method we can, every source of their wealth. If we lose any opportunity of pursuing our interest, for fear of the umbrage which it may give to neutrals, we shall never do any thing for ourselves, because whatever we can propose interferes in some manner with the interest of others.

Cayenne is a place which might have been attacked at any time, during the course of this war, by a detachment from the Barbadoes squadron,

dron, assisted with some small vessels that could go into shallow water. It is an island in the mouth of a river of the same name, lying to the eastward of Surinam in Guiana. It is so far to the southward, that no hurricanes are ever seen there ; so that it could be attempted in the rainy season, at which time our large ships are obliged to take shelter in Tobago.---We know so little of its importance, that we can only judge of it from the very valuable cargoes of the ships which trade thither, from knowing that the settling of this colony was the work of Colbert, and that it gives the French, when they are so minded, an opportunity of settling in South America. But whatever be its value, to distress and straiten our enemies is a sufficient reason for us to reduce it, as being a real loss to them, and giving spirits to our own people.

Had we reduced the French to their territories in Europe, we might then have sported away a few millions in Germany, without many bad consequences. But if there remains no proper object of expence in war, why find out unnecessary ruinous measures to incur that expence, and involve ourselves in debt? Had we subdued all the French colonies, and ruined their marine, were we not saddled with a German war, we might wish France to continue for ever deaf to terms of peace: we should enjoy all those markets at which, from the greater cheapness of their manufactures, they will ever undersel us in time of peace. Nay, the very savings which we should make of the ballance of that destructive trade, which in time of peace we carry on with France, would be sufficient to keep our coasts guarded against their impotent threats; and
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to support all that number of ships which, above what is wanted in time of peace, should be judged necessary to keep their marine in its present low state.

Could we destroy the several nests of French privateers, and by our resolute behaviour shew neutral nations, the Spaniards in particular, that we would not allow our trade to be preyed upon by their pirates, under the pretence of having French commissions, a sea-war with France would make us rich and flourishing; and, instead of contracting yearly twelve millions, would enable us to pay off our national debt. This will be easily perceived, by considering the different state of our commerce, and of that of France, in time of peace.

During peace we carry on a large trade with France, in which the balance is intirely against us. The
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French, in their manufactures, undersell us at every market: by these means have they engrossed almost the whole Turkey trade, and got the most profitable part of the Spanish in their hands. Their liberty to fish on the banks of Newfoundland, from their being able to catch and cure them at less expence than we can, had put the greatest part of that trade into their hands; and if this liberty is renewed at a peace, the same advantage will in a few years divert the whole into that channel. Our sugar islands, far from enabling us to export their produce, are not sufficient for home-consumption, and that of the northern colonies. The East India trade is reckoned to have a ballance against us. The Baltic trade is almost wholly against us. In fine, the only branches that bring in money are the Portugal trade, and that to Holland, but in a small proportion; the poor remains of
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the Spanish trade; and what our traders gain by their underhand dealings with the Spaniards in South America for slaves, &c. and the trade to Guiney; unless we please to add the most destructive manner of bringing money into the country, namely, that of foreigners placing their wealth in our stocks.

Had the French but the cunning to keep quiet at peace for thirty or forty years, and attend to their commerce, so many advantages have they over us in trade, from their situation, their ports in the Mediterranean, the North Seas, their manufactures, connection with Spain, and greater frugality in living; and so many and large are the disadvantageous branches which our luxury and our laziness engage us in, that we should certainly lose to them our boasted superiority on our natural element, the sea.---I say, luxury in our trade to the East
Indies

Indies and to France; laziness in our trade to the Baltic, almost all the articles of which might be had from our North American colonies. This prospect, not more alarming than it is just, ought to make us resolute and steady in the management of the war, and circumspect in the making of a peace.

In the management of the war, that we have a fixed object in view; that our expeditions aim at a point of general utility; that our fleets first take care of our own trade, in sufficient and frequent convoys, and in destroying the enemy's haunts of privateers; then be employed in annoying the trade of the enemy.

In the making of a peace, that we allow not the French to be our partners in that trade, in which we are certain they must cut us wholly out, from their less expensive manner of carrying it on. Here I would be understood

derstood chiefly of the Newfoundland-fishery ; in which if we allow them the least part, we give them up the whole ; even as we see the Dutch, from the same advantage, merely by having a liberty of fishing for herrings on our coasts, have enhanced the whole of that trade, notwithstanding our greatest public efforts to establish it among ourselves.

Will our posterity believe that their fathers could be so absurd as to part with such a mine of wealth as the Newfoundland trade is, for the satisfaction of obliging the French to tumble down a few useless stones, that never were worth to them one tenth part of the expence of collecting them ? Surely, they will say, they who advised to give up this source of riches, for the demolition of Dunkirk, could only be such doctards as, in the beginning of this century, have been frightened by their

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nurses with the names of Guy-Trouin and Dubart; men who could only have rendered themselves famous, or the port they sailed from terrible, during a weak and ignorant administration of our sea-affairs. For this poor sacrifice to give up to the French, our perpetual rivals, a nursery of 30,000 or 40,000 hardy seamen, that may in time wrest the empire of the sea out of our hands, they will reckon a solecism in politics, that could only have place in councils where a vain hectoring spirit sat in the seat of prudence; or where a faction, that hath long made the real interest of their country and sovereign give place to their mean avarice or ambition, hath too much influence. They will hardly be persuaded, that this measure was concluded on when the administration was valued for its firmness, and attention to things of public utility.

The dismantling of Louisbourg mends not this matter ; it is a place so much exposed, that if we can land and lay siege to it, it must always fall into our hands : but perhaps the the next island we cede to dry their fish in (Cape Breton was fit for nothing else) may not be so accessible, nor will our commissary living there, or our ships visiting the place, guard against their strengthening themselves in it. An independent nation, especially one so haughty as the French, could not long brook such insolence ; to insist on it would soon prove the origin of another war.

Our luxury, and the high price of labour among us, render it necessary that in every branch of trade, which we consider as staple, we should endeavour to be unrivalled ; but this of the fishery should be considered as one of our principal commodities, and as much our property as the sal-

mon in our rivers. Certainly this was the light we viewed it in, when, though we did not think fit to employ our own people in catching them, we yet made the Dutch pay tribute for the liberty of fishing. If we had a natural right to insist upon this when the fishery was no object of our own attention, how much more necessary is it now when our being as a maritime power is concerned in it? when it is become the chief thing which we have got to export? Fisheries, where they are cultivated and flourish, always draw after them the empire of the sea; and where this empire is already seated, ought carefully to be attended to, lest unsupported by such a broad basis it fall for ever.

I should not be sorry to see such an occasion given us by the Dutch of resuming from them the herring-fishery as we have now of excluding the
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the French from the Newfoundland banks ; because I fear in a few years fish will be the principal thing which we shall have to carry to a foreign market, and to pay the interest of our national debt.

To give up the Newfoundland fishery for the demolition of Dunkirk, was parting with the right hand of our power and consequence for nothing : to give up Guadaloupe for Minorca, is to give our other hand for a great deal less than nothing. It is reckoned that Guadaloupe can produce one hundred thousand hogsheds of sugar. Now, if we reckon with this the rum and molasses, and consider the many different branches of trade which such a produce must give life and increase to, even was the quantity of sugar made considerably less, we may estimate Guadaloupe at 1,000,000 l. yearly profit to us, and consequently equal to a stock of more than

than 25,000,000l. and if we reckon the expence of the garrison and civil government of Minorca 300,000l. yearly, this must have a capital of at least 8,000,000l. to supply it; which, added to the value of Guadaloupe, will make, by a very moderate calculation, the difference of 33,000,000l. between the keeping of that island and having Minorca restored. Besides, if we keep not Guadaloupe, we must be at a great yearly expence to procure from the French sugar, rum, and molasses, for the consumption of Great Britain and her colonies. And if we return it to the French, the improvements which we have made on it will greatly over-balance the temporary loss that they have suffered by its being a few years in our hands. The Newfoundland fishery and Guadaloupe, appropriated to us, ought then to be indispensable conditions of a peace with France. Let them keep
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Minorca, give them up Belleisle ; and, if they desire it, let them build away at Dunkirk : allow them some privileges on the Africa coast, and in the East Indies : we in these articles have sufficient room to shew our moderation.

We have so tamely submitted to the insolent and treacherous behaviour of the Spaniards, and with such an industrious pusillanimity avoided every occasion of dispute with them, that I cannot help thinking their real quarrel is with Portugal, not with us. The ambitious Spanish monarch thinks, that while we are so deeply engaged in an absurd foreign war, it is a fit opportunity for him to recover what he considers as an ancient part of Spain : he knows that we will endeavour to protect it ; and, perhaps, according to our usual blundering conduct, attempt such a protection by a land-war in Portugal : there, he knows,

knows, he will have the advantage ; and, while we are wearying ourselves in this foolish measure, he will take care to keep his fleets in port, never risking them, but to gain some important point, and that seldom, and with caution.

It certainly is our interest that Portugal keep its independency ; or, as the advantage which we reap from Portugal arises wholly from the Brazils being in their hands, that we keep the Brazils from ever being annexed to the Spanish empire ; for when such an event happens, adieu every advantageous branch of foreign trade. For this reason, and on condition of having an exclusive trade, and not otherwise, we ought to assist Portugal with our fleets ; and, if they want officers, allow such of ours as are willing to enter their service ; but not a regiment should be sent over : once we begin to send men, there is no end to it ;
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every campaign will require so many more thousands ; and the Portuguese will soon learn to think we are fighting our own battles, not with a view to preserve their independency.

As people fight, or should fight, with greater resolution for their liberty and independence, than to extend the dominion of their tyrant, we should hope that the Portuguese, in defence of their country, will be a match for the Spaniards, who only want to make them slaves to their master ; and that an unprovoked attack by the Spaniards will put an end to their divisions : but if they are by their divisions or pusillanimity subdued, we ought by our fleets to secure the Brazils for ourselves ; and there is some reason to believe, that were the Spaniards once convinced of our steady resolution to appropriate the Portuguese colonies to ourselves, if Portugal should come under the

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Spanish yoke, that they would give up their pretensions to the sovereignty of Portugal, rather than see an accession of wealth in our hands, that would far outweigh the advantage of our present trade with Portugal.

Spain can only hurt us by terrifying us with the conquest of Portugal; but if we will turn the tables on them, and threaten them with taking possession of the Brazils, they will soon let go their hold; or, if they are foolish enough to pursue their ambitious projects, they may get possession of a few vineyards and orange-groves, the Portuguese will lose their independency, the family of Braganza their crown, and we shall gain the riches of Brazil. France can only alarm us by threatening Holland (as to Hanover, let Germany and Denmark see to it); but if we appropriate to ourselves their fisheries, and seize upon their colonies, it will be visible
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who will have the best part of the spoil.

The existence of Portugal and Holland, as independent states in Europe, from their neighbourhood to two powerful monarchies, Spain and France, must always be very precarious. From our connections in trade, and the honour of being the assertors of public liberty, we ought, as far as we are able, without involving ourselves in debt, to assist them in maintaining their liberty. But, were each made a province, if we make use of the advantage which our powerful navy gives us, we have no reason to be alarmed, or dread the event. There is not any thing which makes these states of consequence in Europe, but what is in the power of our fleets to make ours. The Dutch fisheries, their carrying trade, their colonies; the Portuguese gold, and precious stones in the Brazils. Nor are these

acquisitions, whenever by the ambition of our rivals it becomes necessary for us to make them our own, things that will be attended with any extraordinary expence. We must, by our treaties, assist these states when they are attacked; we must protect their colonies with our fleets; and the same squadron which saves them from the enemy, will, in case of any disaster befalling their mother-country, put them in our own hands; and it will be in our power to allow their colonies so many advantages, and give them such protection, merely for a nominal sovereignty, and an exclusive trade with them, that in a few years they will reckon the change fortunate which has put them under such mild masters.

I have been thus particular in considering what will be the consequence, should Holland and Portugal lose their independence; because, as often

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as we have any quarrel with France and Spain, they try to alarm us in these quarters, that they may draw us out of our strong fort, our proper element the sea, and engage us at a disadvantage in a land-war: and we are fools so easily imposed upon, that time after time we fall into the snare, and do just as they would wish us to do. Whereas did we, regardless of their threats, continue to make use of our natural strength, our fleets, we might make such a measure turn to their destruction, and our great profit.

Holland and Portugal are two alluring baits for ambitious princes of the house of Bourbon. We are the natural protectors of these precarious states; and it is only necessary for us to exert ourselves by our navy, either to do it so effectually as to preserve their independence, or to secure whatever is valuable in them to our own use.

use. The trade and colonies of Holland and Portugal, in our hands, would be a much stronger barrier against the ambitious projects of France and Spain, than as they are divided among so many different states. An aspiring demagogue in the one, or in the other a short-sighted and ungrateful tyrant, for their present private interest, may turn that wealth and independence which we have preserved for them against us, and may assist our enemies to crush us; but, were the being of these states at an end, we should then have no foreign connections to lead us into ruinous land-wars; our trade would make our navy flourish, and enable us to keep our rivals in awe. It were to be wished, that these hints would make those people, who are better acquainted with our foreign alliances and interest, investigate the matter more thoroughly, and dispel those fears

fears about Holland and Portugal, which have so often alarmed the well-meaning part of this nation, confounded the councils of an otherwise upright administration, and too often served the purposes of a corrupt, ignorant, or timid ministry. We have been so fearful of the existence of Great Britain, that we have long reckoned its fate bound up in the precarious independence of these two states; as if it was every day in the power of a venal Dutch burgomaster, or a capricious tyrant of the family of Braganza, to dispose of our very being to the two branches of the family of Bourbon. Let Britons, for shame, shake off this slavish fear; and be assured, that while they preserve their civil rights at home, and mind only their commerce abroad, no combination, strong enough to hurt them, will ever be formed against them in Europe. Was the paltry
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state of Venice, without half the advantage in situation which we as an island enjoy, able to baffle the strongest alliance that could be formed against her; and shall we, who at present pretend to fight the whole world, in every part of it; who squander away our wealth, and pay large gratuities to states, with whom we have not the least connection, for the mere liberty of fighting in their quarrels; I say, shall we, who must be principal in every quarrel raised in Europe, as if to drain us of our superfluous strength, be afraid lest France, in taking possession of a few marshes, or Spain in seizing a few barren mountains, should annihilate our empire? What absurdity, what odd mixture of the swaggering bully and tame coward in our composition!

As, whatever in time may be the fate of Holland and Portugal, it will
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only be our own blindness, and ignorance of our real interest, that will make us suffer by it; so neither is the power of the king of Prussia, nor even the existence of the protestant interest in Germany, at all essential to our prosperity or independence. Whether the king of Prussia ever took a step with a view to the protestant interest, is a question very doubtful. The annihilation of Protestantism cannot be the work of less than a century; but even suppose us the only protestant state in Europe, this circumstance would add to our power and importance. Britain, in such circumstances, would be an asylum to all who were persecuted for their conscience, which are generally the most industrious useful part of a people: these, if we could not employ them at home, would plant and strengthen our colonies. Our trade, by the reduction of the price of labour,

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bour, would rather be increased than diminished : for, whether we be catholic or heretic, foreigners will only trade with us while we can serve them as well and as cheap as others. Nor need Britons be afraid of being conquered while they are unanimous, and have their liberty to fight for : the strongest force, which could invade them, would be easily baffled. But what reason is there to think that there ever will be such a steady and universal combination of all the powers of Europe to crush one single protestant state, which cannot be shared among them, but must all go to one member of the alliance ? Are the pope's bulls and indulgences still valued ? Does such a regard for religion enter into state-councils, that all Europe should combine in such an hazardous attempt to aggrandize the church ? Commerce, at present, seems to be an object of much more general
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attention in Europe than religion : why do not the Dutch, Danes, Swedes, Portuguese, &c. join to wrest it out of our hands ? None of them would want pretences, if they could be brought to agree, and think the success probable.

When we meddle in the religious disputes of our neighbours, it should be, according to the genius of our religion, as peace-makers, not destroyers of mankind. A kingdom, careful how she puts her majesty and importance to the trial, when she tenders it in a proper manner, will seldom find her mediation refused, or be obliged to use arms to enforce it. By making herself a party she is disqualified from being an umpire. It has been the making ourselves parties in all disputes that has lost us our importance among foreigners, and made us be considered rather as the meddling bullies of Europe than,

what we pretend to aim at, the protectors of its liberties, religious and civil.

If, on this rupture with Spain, we persist in setting the whole world at defiance, and, quitting our own proper arms, resolve to engage every enemy that pleases to start up at their own weapons, we may expect nothing but dissipation and ruin. The war in Germany alone (for of late little else has been attended to) has brought us to the brink of destruction: what then must we expect, when the weight of Spain is cast into the scale against us, but to tumble headlong into the pit? If they raise up a war in Portugal, according to our maxim, we must engage as principals in it, and must perhaps pay subsidies to the Portuguese to fight for their own liberties. Our sea-war will be neglected, and our trade will suffer by swarms of privateers; for,
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as it was said before, it is not likely that Spain will risque her fleets, unless to gain some particular important point; so that her seamen will be employed in privateers to distress our trade, in hopes to make us weary of the war, and glad to comply with their conditions, to give up the protection of Portugal, and resign our conquests to the French.

The Dutch, by their treaties, are obliged to furnish us with a fixed number of ships and of troops, if we should be attacked; but, were we free of a German war, we should have no occasion to make such a requisition: to insist upon it will, I fear, only involve us in greater difficulties; it will be to the French a pretext for over-running Holland, and oblige us to weaken ourselves to assist them.--- According to our common system of politics, a war cannot be undertaken against Spain, without the king of Sardi-

Sardinia as our subsidiary ; but before we open this new drain to our money, let us consider whether he has any real quarrel with Spain, to revenge which this will be a good opportunity : if he has, we may in the Mediterranean co-operate with our fleets ; but there is no occasion to give him money to fight his own battles. If he has no quarrel with Spain, but will enter rashly into it for a subsidy, he is a weak man, and not to be trusted by us.

In our present reduced state, we ought to contract the war as much and as fast as possible ; recal our troops from Germany, and employ them were they can annoy the enemy. If Martinico falls, we shall have then a powerful squadron and considerable land-force to attempt the Havannah, which, if properly conducted, is not reckoned to be a very difficult conquest ; but then we must not, in our
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common way, attack it in its strongest place.

The Havannah is the key to all the Spanish treasures. All their register ships, on account of the long voyage, especially in returning to Europe, in which they are forced to ply to windward, are obliged to stop there, so that taking possession of it is effectually cutting off the communication between Spain and the great source of its wealth ; and if they really intend to interrupt their trade for a time, in hopes to make us soon weary of the war, the loss of this place will intirely defeat their project. With the Havannah all Cuba will fall, and if our general success in war will allow us to insist upon having it yielded to us at a peace, it will fully repay all our expences, and sufficiently supply us in sugar for home consumption and exportation. When the Havannah is in our hands the whole Spanish main

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will lie exposed to our attacks, as Vera-Cruz, &c. The Spaniards will be disabled through the want of it from assisting or relieving them. The march from the coast to the city of Mexico is not above four days : the road is said to be exceeding good, and the place lies so much exposed, that, according to good information, three thousand men properly conducted, might easily make themselves masters of it. A vigorous effort made upon the Havannah in the beginning will give our own people spirits, and be such a stroke to the Spaniards, and a measure so little expected, from our former conduct, by them, that we may reasonably hope it will speedily and effectually reduce them to a pacific disposition.

St. Augustine in Florida is a nest of privateers, that, if not destroyed, will greatly distress our North America and Jamaica trade. We attempted it
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last war with an irregular body of militia, and failed ; but it would be easily taken by a regular force properly conducted, and the neighbourhood of Georgia and Carolina would facilitate the reduction. As the coast is very shallow, perhaps our large ships could not get near enough to batter it ; but a few such vessels as the French prames would do excellently well, and is a contrivance which I am surpris'd has not been thought of, in a war wherein so many expeditions have been undertaken : they can go near the shore, and lie so low in the water, that they are not so easily hit as a large ship ; and I have been informed, by seamen that know them, that they are capable of being sent to any part of the world. Had they been used, would not St. Maloes have fallen ?

If St. Augustine were taken, all Florida would fall with it: this would

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be a depofite in our hands, fhould any difafter befall us in the war ; or if we would add the conquest of Louifiana, which every one reckons to be in our power, and the war ended profperoufly, we might then make the Miffiffippi the boundary of our weftern empire, and intirely cut off all occafion of difpute in America. St. Auguftine would be a convenient ftation to our fhips cruifing for the plate-fleet : this would alfo fecure our infant colonies of Georgia and Carolina, which are the only countries where Spain can hurt us, without an expedition by fea.

Occafion fhould be taken of this war to begin a colony at Darien : without giving the Englifh much trouble, a little indulgence to the Scots would foon make them, with chearfulnefs, refume and complete their favourite fcheme. This colony would be an effectual check upon all
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that part of the Spanish Main which lies to leeward of it, and would open a way to a share of that wealth which the Spaniards draw from South America.

As soon as the season will permit, a strong squadron should be sent into the South Seas. The island of Juan Fernandes should be made at least a temporary colony, to receive the weak and scorbutic part of the crews, in order to recruit themselves, and raise greens and stock, and catch turtle for the squadron; or perhaps some other part of the coast might be found more convenient for these purposes. Our squadron in the East Indies, reinforced, might make an attempt on Manila. Every accessible port in Old Spain should be alarmed. All these vigorous measures are in our power, could we rid our hands of that ruinous Germany: and I fear, if we attempt not the Spaniards in their ports,

and attack not their colonies, they will give us few opportunities of meeting with them at sea.

In treating of a peace with Spain, if the war has been fortunate, we might content ourselves with having Darien confirmed in our possession ; the peninsula of Florida ceded to us ; a country of small consequence to the Spaniards, and chiefly of advantage to us, as with Louisiana in our hands, it would effectually cut off disputes about boundaries ; and if we chuse to make the Spaniards pay for their folly, we may make Cuba the price. A small colony for our logwood cutters should be insisted on ; but it need not have any other view than to protect them. But above all we ought to insist upon coming in for part of that trade which the French enjoy with Spain, and, under proper restrictions, to supply South America publicly with those slaves and
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commodities which these colonies are obliged to have from us in an illicit manner, which is inconvenient and a disadvantage to both. I speak thus positively of the proper terms of a peace with Spain, now that the long dreaded rupture will oblige us to exert ourselves, because every nation supposes themselves forced into a war by the injustice of their neighbours, and therefore should endeavour to make their enemies pay for their expence, and secure themselves against such treatment for the future, and because we ought to have some object for which we fight.

What, appropriate the Newfoundland fishery to ourselves ! Pick a quarrel with the Dutch, in order to resume the herring-fishery from them ! Keep Canada and Guadaloupe ! Seize upon Louifiana and Florida ! Oblige the Spaniards to give us an open trade with their colonies for slaves, &c. and
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confirm our disputed title to the cutting of logwood ! This far exceeds the ambition of a Roman republic. But, even had we all this, we should not have too much in our hands to preserve for us a lasting importance in Europe. The riches of the Spanish colonies will always preserve to that kingdom its consequence in Europe. While Portugal keeps its independence, and the Brazils, it will continue to be considerable. The situation of France, its enterprising spirit, numerous inhabitants, and various manufactures, without one foreign advantage, will ever preserve the influence of that country in Europe. While the Dutch keep their liberty, their parsimony, their colonies and trade, in their private fortunes they will flourish, however involved the public may be in debt. Our debt hath brought us already almost to bankruptcy; our colonies are
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such as rather save expence than bring wealth to us ; we have no sugar to export ; our manufactures are too dear to be purchased by strangers ; and we possess no gold mines to enable us to purchase what we want of other people. In fine, if we consider our situation, independent of the acquisitions which we have made during this war, we have only hands and private industry to depend on ; but if we direct them not properly, we have them to no purpose, and in vain. Besides, when we have got all this, we shall not have more than our due proportion of the New World and East Indies, as divided between us and Spain, Portugal and Holland : even France will still equal, if not exceed us in sugar colonies.

The immense load of our national debt ought to make us exert ourselves vigorously in this war, that we may be able to insist upon such ad-

vantages in the making of a peace as will supply the several funds, for at least paying the interest of it. This, at the end of the war, will require a sum little short of 5,000,000 l. yearly. And since the ambition or encroaching disposition of our enemies hath forced us into this expence, such conquests and such acquisitions as will repay this expence to us, ought to be the principal object in carrying on the war, and the indispensable conditions in treating of a peace.

But upon the annihilation of the Dutch and Portuguese states, according to this plan, the East Indies, the Brazils, and Guiana, will be added to us. If such an event happens, let our rivals, France and Spain, blame their own ill-directed ambition, that throws such an advantage into our hands. Our colonies will be too big for their mother-country, and ruin it. - If the dreaded persecution takes place
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in Germany, that country will supply us with colonists; but they are in some measure ready planted to our hand, and while they are acquiring strength, a few well-disposed garri-sons and squadrons will effectually protect them. Our northern colonies, if encouraged, will soon plant the southern, and easily keep them up.

There is a thing shocking to humanity allowed in our trade, which it is surprising should have so long escaped the notice of our legislature, who are so justly commended for a disinterested attention to the general rights of mankind: as it is not foreign to this subject of the settlement of colonies, I mention it. It is allowing our traders to use spirits as the principal article in dealing with the savages of Africa and America, by which it happens that these wretches, instead of reaping any advantage from their commerce with

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us, having their reasonable faculties improved, or an opportunity of becoming more humanized, have their natural simplicity and sense debauched, and sink into a state truly contemptible. The French allow no spirits to be sold to the Indians of Canada: with this caution, from their intercourse with them, they are polished, sober, industrious, and sensible. The Indians under our protection, from the use of British spirits and New England rum, with which we supply them in great plenty, are lazy, drunken, cowardly, cruel, rude savages, that scarcely have the outward form of man left to them. This is a truth well known to those who have travelled among the French Indians, and compared their manners with such as border on our back settlements. To allow such a corruption of innocence and simplicity for a few paltry advantages in trade, is a disgrace to our country, that can only be

excused by supposing those ignorant of it who have it in their power to put a stop to it.

I shall only mention a few detached observations about the Caribbee Islands, and then conclude. The island of St. Bartholomew, and one half of St. Martin's, belonged to the French, but are now in our hands: they are of little real value, only, as they lie mixed with our islands, they may prove haunts of privateers, and hurt our trade, for which reason they ought to be kept by us. St. Martin's is at present possessed by the people of Anguilla, and should be confirmed to them: their own island is quite barren, and not worth cultivation; so that it would be providing for a number of poor industrious people. Bartholomew may be possessed by a few poor people from Antigua, and the other neighbouring islands. In the proposed division of the neutral islands,

the French insist upon St. Lucia; but this is an island which should by no means be left in their hands. In our hands it could not hurt them in time of peace; but as it lies to windward of Martinico, and very near it, it would prevent a great deal of that hurt which they do to our trade, with the swarm of privateers which in time of war they send out from that island. It has an excellent, commodious, and safe harbour; a thing which is wanting in all our islands, and is not to be found in any other of the neutral ones. Prince Rupert's Bay, in Dominico, is a good anchoring place; but lies too far to the northward, and is too much exposed, for a ship to lie in it during the hurricane season; and it can never be made a careening place it is so large.

Some ignorant people have affirmed, that the neutral islands are equal in value to Guadaloupe. On the

the contrary, considering the high interest of money in the West Indies, our planters would scarcely find them worth the expence of clearing the ground for the reception of the cane. Dominico, in its present state of culture, will be useful to supply us in coffee and cocoa ; but to attempt to make it a sugar island, will not easily or soon succeed. The green verdure, and number of little rivulets trickling down the side of every hill, give a prospect of richness of soil in the neutral islands, which will soon vanish, once they are cleared of that wood which cherishes the rivers, and preserves a moisture on every plant. They will become then as parched, and have as few rivers to water them, as there are in some of our islands, where that preposterous industry has scarce left a shrub, but where the hatchet could not come to destroy it. This is an error which has in a great mea-

measure ruined Antigua and Barbadoes.

These are hints upon the present state of Great Britain, with respect to Europe, which however indigested they may appear in this first essay, yet deserve to be seriously considered. If they are justly founded, they will lessen our fears and enlarge our hopes. The falling of Holland and Portugal as a prey to their powerful neighbours, though not desirable, as a loss to the cause of liberty, will, instead of drawing our ruin along with them, as has been so generally believed, be attended with the greatest profit, and the best consequences to us. If we recollect our situation about the time of the taking of Minorca, the despondency we were then in, our fear of the enemy, our distrust of the ministry, our expectation of every disastrous event, our despair of every thing fortunate; the situation which
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we find ourselves in at present, partly the consequence of a commendable intrepidity, partly the effect of good fortune; was then much more beyond our most sanguine hopes, than, were we free of the continent, the full completion of this scheme may be beyond our present expectations. All that is necessary to complete this plan is to take the lead from our enemies, to shake off our unnatural connections, and exert ourselves manfully on our own element; to pursue invariably our interest, without allowing the threats or menacing preparations of any jealous neighbour to divert our attention from the end in view. For this we may rest assured of, that no state will favour us longer than it is their interest; nor none will injure us, unless they can reap a present advantage from the quarrel. If we allow foreign interests to direct our councils, there is not a step we
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can take for the improvement of our commerce, nor a duty we can lay on a foreign commodity, that will not give umbrage to some one state; yet none will be so hardy as to say, that we ought to drop every such proposal, lest we bring the power of our neighbours, who are affected by it, upon us. Let us, in the management of the war, aim at some fixed object; and, in the making of a peace, mind not punctilios of honour, but solid lasting advantages, that will stand us in stead, when the insolence of demanding hostages, the pulling down of a useless wall, or the glory of visiting a rival's settlement will be forgot, and the honour arising thence laid low in the dust.

The late treaty between France and Spain contains an article regarding commerce which ought to alarm us, and make us exert ourselves to prevent it from taking effect. The
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Spaniards, in all matters of commerce, are to allow the same privileges to the French, and consider them as Spaniards. The French, in return, are to shew them the like favour. As France can supply the Spaniards with every thing, excepting perhaps slaves, with which we now supply them, this will intirely cut off all our open trade with Old Spain, unless it is to buy what we want of them for money. The Spaniards will take the most effectual methods, in which they will likewise be supported by France, to prevent any illicit trade from being carried on between us and their colonies. The dominions of the two families of Bourbon, thus mutually supplying each other in what either wants, need carry on no foreign trade but that which has a balance in their favour. This will be such an accession of real power and wealth to the two crowns as will in

time be severely felt by us; and therefore the chief object of our present war with them should be to oppose the completion of their scheme, either by forcing Spain to depart from such an alliance, and allow us an open trade in certain particular commodities; or by wresting those colonies out of their hands, from the produce of which alone such a commerce as they want to establish can turn out advantageous to both. It need not here be repeated, that the German war is a very preposterous method of endeavouring to bring this about; and that to attend to our expeditions against their settlements will be the only effectual means of bringing this war to a happy issue.

The Athenians in the Sicilian war pretended to vindicate the quarrel of the Leontines; and were so madly bent upon glory and conquest, that to carry on a distant war, in which they

they had no interest, their utmost strength was exerted, and the city was drained of men and money to support it. The disastrous issue of this war gave a fatal blow to their power; and, in a few years after, this with the Peloponnesian war completed their ruin, so that they never were able to recover themselves. Indeed, after their defeat in Sicily, from their superior skill in maritime affairs, by some extraordinary efforts at sea, they were able at times to give a favourable turn to the war, and ward off destruction for a while; but their real vigour had been lost in Sicily. They had no strength to pursue a victory, no resource left to repair a misfortune.

How parallel to theirs is our present situation, unless we in time perceive our true interest. Twenty-eight thousand men (not as has been given out fifteen thousand only) have fallen by the enemy and by diseases in Germany.

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many. Our treasure has there been squandered away by millions ; and all this to support a prince who has no title to our friendship, and to subdue an enemy who comes there on purpose to meet us ; and who, were it not his interest to seek us in that field, needs only retire behind his strong frontier towns to avoid being hurt by us. We indeed have had some little success at sea ; but now, when our enormous debt is increased, when our vigour begins to abate, and our men and money, those nerves and sinews of war, are exhausted, if we still persist, we shall, amidst all our splendid acquisitions and glorious campaigns, sink down at once, and lose for ever our importance and independence in Europe. Our comfort is, that it is yet in the power of a virtuous and steady administration to prevent these evils, and fix the prosperity of Great Britain on a solid foundation.

F I N I S.